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THE GRAY (GOODS) ELEPHANT IN THE 
ROOM: CHINA’S TROUBLING ATTITUDE 
TOWARD IP PROTECTION OF GRAY 
MARKET GOODS 
INTRODUCTION: HUNGRY FOR THE FIRST BITE OF THE APPLE 
eptember 17, 2010: Apple’s newest, hottest release, the iPad®, 
successfully debuted in China,1 one of the world’s largest markets. 
This was an achievement for Apple® after the disastrous launch of the 
Chinese iPhone® in 2009,2 when the typically dynamic company could 
not move stock from the shelves.3 The reason? Interested Chinese buyers 
had long owned iPhones®. Apple’s iPhone® debut in China lagged near-
ly two years behind its introduction to the United States and Europe.4 
Many Chinese consumers ordered hacked and reprogrammed phones, 
shipped in from hubs like Prague and New York.5 Some of the phones 
made an even shorter journey as they simply “leaked” into the market 
from the Chinese factories where they were produced.6 Apple’s global 
vision was no match for the dynamic gray market. 
The gray market, or parallel market,7 occurs when goods intended for 
one market are redirected, unauthorized, to another.8 The goods literally 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. Loretta Chao, China Gets the iPad, WALL ST. J. CHINA REAL TIME BLOG (Sept. 
17, 2010, 5:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/09/17/china-gets-the-ipad/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Compare Matthew Honan, Apple Unveils iPhone, MACWORLD (Jan. 9, 2007), 
http://www.macworld.com/article/54769/2007/01/iphone.html, with Chao, supra note 1 
(providing date of iPhone debut in China). 
 5. Peter Burrows, Inside the iPhone Gray Market, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 
12, 2008), 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2008/tc20080211_152894.htm. 
 6. Id. 
 7. A “gray good” belonging in the “gray market,” as defined by the United States, is 
“a foreign-manufactured good, bearing a valid United States trademark, that is imported 
without the consent of the United States trademark holder.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 
486 U.S. 281, 285 (1988). Thus, the phrase is technically very narrow. However, this 
concept has been extended and is often used interchangeably with similar provisions for 
patented and copyrighted materials, such as “parallel market,” and need not be manufac-
tured abroad. DAVID R. SUGDEN, GRAY MARKETS: PREVENTION, DETECTION AND 
LITIGATION 4 (2009); Stefan M. Miller, Parallel Imports: Towards a Flexible Uniform 
International Rule, 15 J. COM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 21, 22 (2009). In this Note, “gray good” 
and “gray market” are used as general terminology indicating products imported through 
unauthorized channels. However, “parallel import” refers to the verb, due to nuance. 
“Parallel import,” referring to goods, is only used for clarity while mentioning both gray 
goods and the black market. 
S 
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parallel those imported through the authorized channel. For example, 
“Business” authorizes ten units to be sold to a retailer in country A and 
five to be sold to a separate retailer in country B, pricing the same goods 
differently to target specific markets. Business is unaware that the retail-
er in B resells its units to stores in A and C. The stores in A and C have 
just engaged in parallel importation. Essentially, Business ends up com-
peting with itself, as its lower priced goods destined for B compete 
against the higher priced goods in A’s market. The purpose of this indi-
rect importation is often to supply the product to a void, like the iPhone’s 
initial China release, but more likely, it is to undersell the goods intended 
for that market.9 Essentially, those who parallel import from cheaper na-
tions can sell the same product at a lower price than those who use the 
authorized channel. 
Americans today are familiar with the gray market as it affects them. 
Stores like Costco stock their shelves with affordably priced products 
often redirected from foreign locales.10 Textbooks ordered from the in-
ternet arrive in College Hill by way of Hong Kong.11 Westerners are 
comfortable importing goods on a whim from major developing coun-
tries like China. Seldom, however, do Westerners contemplate China’s 
own massive economy and subsequent pull on the gray market. 
Some may see parallel imports as a fair extension of the global mar-
ketplace.12 This does, after all, allow companies to reach new markets.13 
However, the gray market expert David R. Sugden explained, “As the 
name aptly suggests, gray market goods reside in the murky area of law 
between legitimacy and illegality.”14 Many large companies distributing 
products globally find grounds to litigate,15 and governments are con-
cerned, too, as they miss out on potential sales tax revenue on the autho-
                                                                                                                                     
 8. Jorge Espinosa, What is the Parallel Market?, THE GRAY BLOG (last visited Sept. 
30, 2010), http://espinosaiplaw.com/wordpress/?page_id=5. 
 9. For an illustration of this concept, see WARWICK A. ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS 
1 (1993). 
 10. Daniel Fisher, Costco v. Omega Tests the Power of a Logo, FORBES ON THE 
DOCKET BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010, 6:53 PM), 
http://blogs.forbes.com/docket/2010/04/19/costco-v-omega-tests-power-of-a-logo. 
 11. See Jeff Shelstad, The Demise of the $200 Textbook, GOOD (July 8, 2010), 
http://www.good.is/post/the-demise-of-the-200-textbook. 
 12. See SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 30–31. 
 13. Id. at 60–62. Pricing appropriately for the destination ensures that an article has a 
better chance of selling in that new market. Id. 
 14. Id. at 4–5. 
 15. See SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 297–309 (describing approaches companies may 
pursue globally.) 
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rized product’s higher price.16 Additionally, governments are concerned 
about the lack of regulation of gray market goods—when unauthorized—
products used or even ingested by consumers may be tampered with or of 
inferior quality.17 Not only does the gray market pose risks and disrupt a 
company’s profitability, it also poses problems for the entity’s intellec-
tual property rights (“IPR”).18 
Companies may have trademark, patent, and copyright claims from the 
unauthorized sale and importation of goods.19 Trademarks help identify a 
company’s products and services by distinguishing them from similar 
ones20 with the purpose of establishing “goodwill.”21 They may be sym-
bols, words, names, or devices, among other indicators.22 Copyright pro-
tects expression of an idea through original works of authorship, be it a 
fine painting, video game, or logo design.23 Concerned companies may 
defend products bearing copyrighted logos, copyrightable content, or a 
trademark through various intellectual property laws. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Costco v. Omega24 catapulted 
the gray market to the top of American and other Western countries’ at-
tention.25  Following similar U.S. cases where trademark infringement 
                                                                                                                                     
 16. For a discussion of the tax implications of black market goods, see id. at 56–59. 
 17. Lack of control over one’s products opens parallel imports to typical black market 
problems. Id. at 5–6. However, quality control issues may arise from a manufacturer 
itself. For example, Tic Tacs intended for different markets feature different ingredients 
and Abercrombie sells lower quality clothing to foreign markets. Id. at 16–18. Consumers 
may be unaware that they are purchasing lesser goods imported through the parallel mar-
ket. 
 18. Intellectual Property is the law of patents, copyrights, and trademarks (among 
others). It protects the intangible, and “the law creates the property by defining what will 
be protected from others.” DONALD A. GREGORY ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 1–2 (1994). Essentially, it protects ideas and inventions, expression and works 
of authorship, good will and designations of origin. Id. at 2–4. 
 19. PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA 1 (Christopher Heath ed., 2004) [hereinafter 
PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA]. This should not distract from the fact that parallel import 
issues are mostly economic. ROTHNIE, supra note 9, at 3. 
 20. U.K. TRADE & INVESTMENT, U.K. INTELLECTUAL. PROP. OFFICE., HUNTER 
RODWELL CONSULTING & ROUSE & CO. INT’L, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PRIMER 
FOR CHINA 9 (2008) [hereinafter CHINA IP PRIMER]. 
 21. Michael A. Ugolini, Gray Market Goods Under the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. 451, 462 (1999).   
 22. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 18, at 81. 
 23. See id. at 4, 168–69. Logos typically fall under trademark protection but copy-
right may also be applicable. Compare id. at 186–87, with id. at 154. Patents protect in-
ventions but are not discussed for purposes of this Note. Id. at 2. 
 24. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010). 
 25. This case was highly visible as leading news outlets across the United States re-
ported its developments. See Court Ruling in Costco Case Could Affect Discount Retail-
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action was denied because the items in question were genuine, the Swiss 
watchmaker Omega sued Costco for purchasing and selling watches in 
the United States that were originally priced and distributed to cheaper 
markets. 26  Omega pursued this action through copyright protection, 
claiming that its copyrighted logo featured on the underside of the watch 
makes the entire watch protectable, and thus this sale violated Omega’s 
exclusive control of its copyright.27 The Ninth Circuit determined that the 
first sale doctrine, a limit on exclusive control after the first sale, only 
applied to goods “legally made” within the United States.28 Since the 
watches were made in Switzerland, Omega could continue its control 
over the copyrighted material.29 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
and businesses and consumers everywhere waited anxiously for clarifica-
tion on the right to resell copyrighted material.30 However, the Supreme 
Court’s decision further confused matters by affirming Omega’s right to 
control without establishing precedent, 31  leaving American resellers, 
consumers, and businesses without clear direction. 
                                                                                                                                     
ers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, at B11 [hereinafter Court Ruling in Costco Case Could 
Affect Discount Retailers]. 
 26. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2008). 
As there were only nine words to the Supreme Court decision, this Note refers to the 
lower courts’ discussion of the issues. For an explanation, see Jorge Espinosa, Supreme 
Court Will Revisit Quality King Distributors, Inc v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., THE 
GRAY BLOG, http://espinosaiplaw.com/wordpress/?p=93 (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). For a 
possible reason for the split, see Fisher, supra note 10; Greg Stohr, Elena Kagan, the 
Absent Supreme Court Justice, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 23, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_40/b4197031526266.htm. 
 27. David Kravets, All Rise: Supreme Court’s Geekiest Generation Begins, WIRED 
(Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/supreme-court-2010-2011-
term. 
 28. Omega S.A., 541 F.3d at 900. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Court Ruling in Costco Case Could Affect Discount Retailers, supra note 25. 
 31. Supreme Court’s Tie Vote Sustains Swatch Against Costco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2010, at B7. This decision revolved around the “first sale” doctrine, also known as “ex-
haustion,” which says that copyrightable materials in the form of chattels (tangible ob-
jects) may only be controlled by the author during the first sale. Any subsequent reselling 
is beyond the author’s control. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT 
LAW 328–31 (2010). Costco v. Omega suggests that this could be limited to products 
within the United States, providing authors of copyrightable materials manufactured out-
side of the United States perpetual or at least greater control than those from within the 
United States. Supreme Court Rebuffs Costco in Copyright Challenge, FORBES FULL 
DISCLOSURE BLOG (Dec. 13, 2010, 1:31 PM), 
http://blogs.forbes.com/danielfisher/2010/12/13/supreme-court-rebuffs-costco-in-
copyright-challenge [hereinafter Supreme Court Rebuffs Costco in Copyright Challenge]. 
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This controversy is not unique to the United States. Regardless of 
American laws about the American market, large emerging economies 
are clamoring for the same goods as the rest of the world, but at lower 
prices. China, well known for its exports, is one of the world’s largest 
economies32 with the world’s largest population,33 and is thus naturally a 
dynamic importer.34 Over 12% of its $954.3 billion imports35 come from 
Japan and another 7.66% from the United States.36 China, as an extreme-
ly populous importer of expensive goods, is ripe for parallel importation 
issues. 
Those attune to IPR around the world should carefully watch the issue 
of gray goods. China is already branded with a scarlet ©, as it is often 
labeled a “chronic and notorious abuser of IPR.”37 This is particularly 
important considering that China today is the third largest trading na-
tion38 and is obligated to protect IPR through a series of treaties.39 Copy-
right and trademark laws with respect to trade are loosely enforced in 
China, and though improving, it is dubious whether China is ready to 
address IPR to the same degree as the developed world. This potentially 
poses problems for companies hoping to protect against parallel imports 
in China by asserting IPR claims. 
China shed its Communist regime only a few decades ago, and a new 
capitalist market quickly sprung up in its void.40 Although China became 
obligated to protect intellectual property upon joining the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (“WIPO”) in 198041 and World Trade Organ-
                                                                                                                                     
 32. See GORDON C. K. CHEUNG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA: POLITICS 
OF PIRACY, TRADE AND PROTECTION 5 (2009). 
 33. As of July 2010, China’s population was 1,330,141,295. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY (CIA), THE WORLD FACTBOOK, EAST & SOUTHEAST ASIA: CHINA (2010) [herei-
nafter WORLD FACTBOOK], available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ch.html (follow “Download Publication” hyperlink). 
 34. The CIA World Fact Book lists China as the third largest purchasing power and 
the sixth largest “real growth rate” in the world. Id. 
 35. 2009 estimate. Id. 
 36. WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 34. 
 37. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 306; see also Greg Creer, The International Threat to 
Intellectual Property Rights Through Emerging Markets, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 213, 218–19 
(2004). 
 38. Susan Ariel Aaronson, How Disciplining China Could Save the WTO, 
VOXEU.ORG (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4581. 
 39. PETER GANEA & THOMAS PATTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA, at xiii 
(Christopher Heath ed., 2005). 
 40. See Creer, supra note 37, at 213, 218. 
 41. Treaties and Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. [WIPO], 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=35C (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) 
[hereinafter WIPO, Contracting Parties]. The WIPO is a United Nations agency that 
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ization (“WTO”) in 2001,42 the concept of intellectual property itself may 
be incompatible to Chinese culture. Intellectual property’s concept of the 
ownership of the intangible is often regarded as incompatible with social-
ism’s discouragement of ownership, which still maintains a large Chi-
nese allegiance. 43  Ownership itself may be an amoral concept under 
Eastern philosophy,44 posing large problems for a Westernized nuanced 
argument against parallel importation. 
This Note posits that China’s protection of copyrights and trademarks 
for parallel goods will continue to be limited, as demonstrated by recent 
judicial decisions, even with the looming possibility of international ac-
tion. This analysis must be addressed through the lens of Chinese IPR 
obligations and enforcement in addition to the gray market. Part I ex-
plores the emergence and ambiguous illegality of the gray market. Part II 
assesses China’s legal obligations, both internationally and intranational-
ly, to protect copyrights and trademarks, including potential policing of 
gray market goods. Part III analyzes China’s erratic enforcement of IPR 
as illustrated by the recent Shanghai Unilever Co. Ltd. v. Commercial 
Importing and Exporting Trading Co. of Guanghzou Economic Techolo-
gy Developing District, Hui Zhong Fa Shi Chu Zi and Michelin Group v. 
Tan Guoqiang and Ou Can45 cases, among others. Part IV proposes a 
possible solution in the face of a world pushing for stricter protections 
from the gray market. 
                                                                                                                                     
seeks reasonable international intellectual property standards. What is WIPO?, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2010). 
 42. Member Information: China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG. [WTO], 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) 
[hereinafter WTO, Member Information]. The WTO is an international organization de-
signed to facilitate trade negotiations and policies for member governments. Understand-
ing the WTO: What We Do, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_we_do_e.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 
2010). 
 43. Creer, supra note 37, at 220. 
 44. See id. (explaining that ownership “is suspect to possible illegalities and dis-
grace”). 
 45. Most Chinese cases are not available in English, if they have been published at 
all. Few primary sources were available at the time of drafting this Note. The author re-
lies on experts’ (practicing attorneys, scholars, and professors) recounting of the deci-
sions. This Note features the most complete case citations possible without actual access. 
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I. INTO THE DEEP GRAY OCEAN: AN IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION OF THE 
GRAY MARKET 
“Globalization . . . is as old as ambition.”46 Even though globalization 
is not novel, today it possesses a new instantaneous element, mostly due 
to the internet’s free flowing commerce.47 Although technology trans-
formed humankind’s ability to reach the corners of the world, interna-
tional trade would not look as it does today without a recent shift in 
global political status. Only two decades ago, the world was divided by 
ideology and matching trade barriers. With the transformation of physi-
cal barriers, “the 1990s became a watershed decade of intangible barrier 
removal.”48 In the span of twelve years, the Berlin Wall fell and China 
joined the WTO, opening previously quartered off areas of the world for 
trade with other nations.49 From these new economies, fueled by tech-
nology, the gray market exploded. 
Although the gray market’s channels were carved by shifting global 
policy and technological advancement, industry itself is instrumental in 
supplying the market with product.50 Sugden asserts that by dumping 
inventory to meet short-term sales goals, companies undermine their long 
term plans.51 Discount retailers like Marshalls and TJ Maxx then sell the 
same products as traditional retail outlets, at much lower prices. 
Of more international concern is global pricing strategy. In order to 
penetrate international markets and achieve some level of sales success, 
companies will price goods to sell in a nation’s specific market.52 How-
ever, this has unintended consequences. A company may price a bicycle 
for $300 in the United States, but only $250 in Brazil and $180 in Mex-
ico. Businesses in the United States will buy the bicycles from Mexico at 
$180, incur the shipping costs, and still be able to sell the bikes for $250 
in the United States, underselling those bikes that were priced for the 
American market. 
Controlling distribution channels prevents underselling as well as other 
harms. Black market goods, which may harm consumers and brands, of-
ten intermingle with parallel imports that are out of the brand’s control.53 
The term gray market itself reflects this possible contamination. Gray 
                                                                                                                                     
 46. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 29. 
 47. Id. at 32. 
 48. Id at 37. 
 49. Id. at 37–38. 
 50. See id. at 40–41. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Espinosa, supra note 8. 
 53. For discussion of a case study on the intermingling and counterfeit baby formula, 
see SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 53. 
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market has many definitions including the traditionally illegal,54 but most 
accurately refers to “goods diverted from a brand owners’ authorized sale 
channel.”55 While industry numbers are disputed,56 the impact of the pa-
rallel market is economically significant. 
As discussed in the Introduction, in much of the world, parallel impor-
tation is not automatically illegal. In fact, it is in line with WTO free 
trade principles.57 Additionally, industry continuously chooses to host 
production in countries that are notorious for leaks.58 Companies’ wil-
lingness to provide this vulnerability paired with the concept of free trade 
creates rampant parallel importation. However, industry’s displeasure 
with international markets is substantial as well. Companies and their 
parent nations subsequently found a creative way to address this issue: 
intellectual property. 
Intellectual property is an increasingly important barrier to the gray 
market, particularly trademark and copyright.59 It may seem curious that 
companies attempting to crack down on parallel importation pursue intel-
lectual property litigation. They are, after all, the same products by the 
very same companies, not counterfeit products. However, both trademark 
and copyright provide circuitous causes of action for parallel importa-
tion. By protecting creative content or a brand, companies may be able to 
                                                                                                                                     
 54. Id. at 4. 
 55. Id. (quoting DAVID M. HOPKINS ET AL., COUNTERFEITING EXPOSED 10 (2003)). 
 56. Grant Gross, US Panel Looks at Intellectual Property Violations in China, PC 
WORLD (June 15, 2010), 
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/198901/us_panel_looks_at_intellectual_p
roperty_violations_in_china.html. Some have raised concern that consumers who pur-
chase products at a fraction of the true price are not the same consumers that would buy 
the item at its original, elevated price. Peter Yu of Drake University recently suggested 
that these markets may even benefit Americans by further disseminating American dem-
ocratic culture. Peter K. Yu, Three Questions that Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China 
Intellectual Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 425 (2008) 
[hereinafter Yu, Three Questions]. 
 57. Miller, supra note 7, at 24. Free trade principles refer to the WTO’s fair competi-
tion policy, which is reflected in its “system of rules dedicated to open, fair and undis-
torted competition.” Basics: Principles of the Trading System, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 
2010) [hereinafter WTO, Principles]. There is a logical tension between free trade prin-
ciples and the monopoly afforded to IPR holders, but protection stimulates investment. 
See ROTHNIE, supra note 9, at 8. 
 58. See SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 102–03. 
 59. Id. at 5. It is important to note that copyright and trademark are technical and 
intricate concepts, and vary among nations, although reciprocity is often available inter-
nationally. This brief overview is not intended to fully assess the facets of copyright and 
trademark, but instead this Note assumes that one has followed proper copyright or 
trademark procedures and has a claim regarding infringement. 
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prevent the sale of the underlying good and the corresponding financial 
blow. 
Trademarks “associate a product with a particular [unique] source,”60 
developing consumer trust and loyalty.61 Trademarks include logos, slo-
gans, names, and even physical characteristics of the product.62 Compa-
nies argue that the gray market undermines its trademark, and thus de-
stroys public trust of the brand, through dilution63 and harm to good-
will.64 Avoidance of the authorized distribution channel can create vulne-
rabilities from lack of warranty or quality control,65 which may actually 
make the same product materially different, and thus violative of a prod-
uct’s trademark.66 
Copyright in the United States and other nations is arguably more akin 
to traditional property rights than trademarks.67  Copyright provides a 
(limited) right of distribution68 and a right of performance,69 among oth-
ers, which are useful in two ways. First, copyright offers traditional pro-
tection to creative original works like books or software.70 Publishers 
constantly struggle against the stream of books coming from external 
markets.71 The second way copyright can be used to protect against gray 
goods is slightly less obvious, and arguably weak. Companies may liti-
                                                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 242. 
 61. “The brand is a contract between a brand owner and its consumers.” Id. at 5. 
Since the gray market is often indistinguishable from the authorized, the stolen, and the 
counterfeited, weak brand control can destroy consumer confidence. Id. at 5–6. 
 62. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 9. 
 63. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 244. Dilution can be either “tarnishment” or “blurring.” 
Id. at 244–45. 
 64. See id. at 257–59. 
 65. Donna K. Hintz, Battling Gray Market Goods with Copyright Law, 57 ALB. L. 
REV. 1187, 1189 (1994). 
 66. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 260–81. 
 67. ROTHNIE, supra note 9, at 186. 
 68.  Basic Notions of Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO Int’l Bureau, 6–7, 
WIPO/IPTK/MCT/02/INF/10 (Nov. 2001), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/activities/pdf/basic_notions.pdf; see also Tan Leng 
Cheo & Partners, Copyright Law and Parallel Imports (Aug. 28, 2001), 
http://www.accountlaw-tax.com.sg/Website_tlc/ws-parallel%20import.htm (a discussion 
of this right and its possible infringement in the United States and Singapore, with a brief 
discussion of Australia as well). 
 69. INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THEORY AND PRACTICE 155 (WIPO 
ed., 1997). A right of performance creates exclusivity in the rights to “perform” video 
games, music, and other entertainment articles. 
 70. ROTHNIE, supra note 9, at 154. 
 71. See AUSTL. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, RESTRICTIONS ON THE PARALLEL 
IMPORT OF BOOKS 1.1 (2009), available at 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/90265/books.pdf. 
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gate the sale of their goods based on a logo or other designed or written 
material attached to a product rather than the product itself.72 However, 
countries are often uneasy about allowing trademark or logo protections 
to be employed in a manner that acts as a barrier to trade.73 
The first sale doctrine is often a limit to IPR and may also be called 
“exhaustion of rights” or simply “exhaustion.” After the first sale of a 
trademark protected, patented, 74  or copyrighted good, the intellectual 
property holder’s rights are literally exhausted, and so the importer is 
free from this constraint.75 While this doctrine and its application vary 
tremendously worldwide, it is often acknowledged on at least a regional 
level.76 Application of this concept can legally facilitate the gray mar-
ket.77 
II. CHINA’S IPR LAWS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Understanding China’s domestic and international IPR obligations is 
essential for finding possible avenues to combat gray goods. IPR has 
largely been imposed on China by the Western world through a complex 
                                                                                                                                     
 72. As mentioned above, this is the angle that Omega pursued in Costco v. Omega. 
See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 73. See Quality King Distrib. Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 153 
(1998). 
 74. This Note focuses on trademark and copyright, as parallel importation of patented 
goods has received much attention due to the pharmaceutical industry. For information 
on this topic, see Bryan A. Liang, Fade to Black: Importation and Counterfeit Drugs 32 
AM. J. L. & MED. 279, 287–88 (2006). For a different angle, see Ben Sihanya, Patents, 
Parallel Importation and Compulsory Licensing of HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Experience in 
Kenya, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case19_e.htm 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2011). 
 75. ROTHNIE, supra note 9, at 128, 237, 495. 
 76. For the defense as applied to trademark, see SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 282–84; 
copyright, id. at 218–32. As previously mentioned, the boundaries of this doctrine in the 
United States are unclear. The EU does not follow the first sale doctrine, but instead 
compensates authors for resale through the idea of “droit de suite.” The UK is waiting to 
see how this develops in the United States. For more on first sale internationally, see 
Theo Papadapoulos, The First-Sale Doctrine in International Intellectual Property Law: 
Trade in Copyright Related Entertainment Products 2 ENT. LAW 40, 50–59 (2003); see 
also LEAFFER, supra note 31, at 339 (for a discussion of droit de suite). 
 77. Exhaustion is multifaceted. It can be applied regionally, nationally, or even inter-
nationally. Thus, currently, one may resell intellectual property within the EU, but out-
side of the EU one may not resell that good without a continuation of the author’s rights. 
Miller, supra note 7, at 24, 36–37. For the purposes of this Note, which focuses on 
whether China meets its IP obligations in regard to the gray market, evidenced by the 
Chinese judiciary and options moving forward, the nuances are tangential. For in depth 
discussion, see id. 
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system of treaties.78 Although China has made tremendous efforts to as-
similate, it still lags behind in meeting widely accepted IPR standards.79 
As gray goods have tenebrous legal status in global treaties,80 it is unlike-
ly that treaties provide adequate foundation to pursue action against the 
gray market despite enhanced IPR standards. However, China potentially 
faces disputes over gray goods with large trading nations even despite 
consensus on parallel import legality in the Western world. 
A. An Evolution 
In 1903, China addressed Western IPR concerns for the first time by 
entering into a treaty with the United States providing foreigners with 
formal IPR protections.81 Additional attempts to implement IPR protec-
tions continued throughout Chinese history, but these were not as suc-
cessful as intended (from the Western perspective), partly due to “wars, 
warlordism, famines, revolutions, and political struggles.”82 Efforts were 
further diminished in the communist post-World War II era when the 
Chinese Communist Party took control and nationalized commerce, ef-
fectively undermining the idea of private or exclusive rights, including 
expression.83 
China emerged from communism to join the world market in 1978, ea-
ger to participate and “put IPRs as one of the priorities on its reform 
agenda.”84 In a big step toward hallowing IPR, China joined the WIPO in 
                                                                                                                                     
 78. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 16. 
 79. For the specific example of software piracy, see Sewell Chan, China Agrees to 
Intellectual Property Protections, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2010, at B4. For a broader look at 
the evolution of China’s intellectual property measures, see generally WILLIAM ALFORD, 
TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE 
CIVILIZATION 1–8 (1995). 
 80. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 298–99. 
 81. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 32. The treaty “granted copyright, patent, and trade-
mark protection to Americans in return for reciprocal protection to the Chinese.” Peter K. 
Yu, The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in China 6 (Benjamin N. Cardo-
zo Sch. of Law, Yeshiva Univ., Occasional Papers in Intellectual Property Law, No. 11, 
2002) [hereinafter Yu, Second Coming], available at www.peteryu.com/2dcoming.pdf. 
 82. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 3. China introduced copyright law in 1910, 
patent law in 1912, and trademark law in 1923, all of which were reworked after Guo-
mindang came to power in the late 1920s. Id. at 6–7. “Although these laws appeared on 
paper, they offered foreigners very limited intellectual property protection.” Id. at 6. This 
failure may be attributed to the government’s disappointment that China’s IPR protection 
“would not affect China’s semi-colonial status.” Id. at 7. 
 83. Id. at 7. 
 84. SHAHID ALIKHAN, SOCIO-ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 64 (2000). 
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1980.85 Over the next two decades, China joined the WIPO’s Paris Con-
vention,86 the Madrid Agreement in 1989, and the Madrid Protocol in 
1995. 87  Importantly, China joined the WIPO’s Berne Convention in 
1992.88 The Berne Convention allows a member country to seize illegal 
and intellectual property infringing products when imported or found 
within its borders.89 Foreign works are protectable under the Berne Con-
vention and do not need to be registered with the nation to be recog-
nized,90 enhancing a foreign owner’s ability to protect goods in member 
nations like China. Even though Berne “lacks any enforcement mechan-
ism,”91 the effect on China was immediate.92 Approximately 60% of lite-
                                                                                                                                     
 85. WIPO, Contracting Parties, supra note 41. 
 86. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property emerged in 1883 
and protects industrial property like patents and trademarks. WIPO Treaties—General 
Information, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). 
China joined the convention in 1985. Contracting Parties—China, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?search_what=C&country_id=38C (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2010). 
 87. The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Agreement on Marks, Apr 
14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389; Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Marks, adopted June 27, 1989, WIPO Pub. No. 204(E) [he-
reinafter Madrid Protocol]. As of 2010, eighty-five countries are in the Madrid Protocol. 
Madrid Protocol, supra. The Madrid Protocol and Agreement are known collectively as 
the Madrid system, and create a multination trademark recognition system. Summary of 
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (1891) and 
the Protocol Relating to that Agreement (1989), WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/madrid/summary_madrid.html (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2010). 
 88. PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 90 (2d ed. 2003). The Berne 
Convention emerged in 1886, when the world collectively addressed intellectual property 
rights. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
17 U.S.C. 104, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Berne Convention 
established an administrative body which became the World Intellectual Property Organ-
ization in 1967. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, 
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1770, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (last amended Sept. 28, 1979). The United 
Nations later absorbed the organization in 1974. Agreement between the United Nations 
and the World Intellectual Property Organization, G.A Res. 3346 (XXIX), U.N. 
Doc.A/RES/3346 (XXIX) (Dec. 17, 1974). With 164 signatories, the Berne Convention is 
accepted by most trading nations. Contracting Parties—Berne Convention, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 (last visited Nov. 10, 
2010) [hereinafter Contracting Parties—Berne Convention]. 
 89. Creer, supra note 37, at 214. 
 90. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 15. However, registration is often recom-
mended as “proof.” Id. The Berne Convention only requires “production” of enumerated 
expressions, leaving “legislation in the countries of the Union to prescribe that works in 
general or any specified categories of works shall not be protected unless they have been 
fixed in some material form.” Berne Convention, supra note 88, art. 2, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 91. Ugolini, supra note 21, at 453. 
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rature titles published in China in 1994 were new,93 indicative of the ef-
fective incentive of IPR for innovation. 
Regardless of China’s improvements, the United States aggressively 
pursued IPR reform in China, with U.S.-Chinese disputes budding in the 
early 1990s.94 This watch-dog attitude stems from the United States’ 
tremendous interest in China’s protection of IPR, as American sales of 
goods and services to the Chinese market was recently valued at 98.4 
billion USD per year.95 American rumblings gave way to trade tête-à-
tête, punctuated by the United States’ investigation and mutual sanc-
tions,96 with crisis averted at the last minute by the Sino-American Me-
morandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property in 
1992.97 China promptly improved patent and trademark protections and 
upgraded its copyright provisions to satisfy the Berne Convention. 98 
Over the next two years China and the United States negotiated twenty 
times,99 repeating the same quarrel and, again, culminating in agreement 
(the Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights) in February of 
1995.100 But tensions returned in 1996.101 
                                                                                                                                     
 92. ALIKHAN, supra note 84, at 64. 
 93. Id. 
 94. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 32–33. The United States pursued IPR protection 
against China in 1991, via Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Id. at 33. Section 301 
enables the President to “investigate and impose sanctions on countries engaging in un-
fair trade practices that threaten the United States’ economic interests.” Yu, Second Com-
ing, supra note 81, at 9. 
 95. Figure from 2009 referring to multinational American companies engaging in 
business with China. Victoria Slind-Flor, Volkswagen, Krka, Pink Floyd: Intellectual 
Property, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 16, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-12-16/volkswagen-krka-pink-floyd-
intellectual-property.html. While exact numbers are difficult to obtain due to the issue’s 
complexity, intellectual property violations cost American businesses hundreds of mil-
lions, if not billions, of dollars per year. See generally U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N 
[USITC], CHINA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION 
POLICIES, AND FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY, at xiv–
xvi (2010), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf. The ability 
of the U.S. to address these situations is substantial, as TRIPS itself was borne of U.S. 
complaints regarding the loss of $50 billion from weak IPR enforcement. CHEUNG, supra 
note 32, at 12. 
 96. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 9. 
 97. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 5. 
 98. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 10. 
 99. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 33. 
 100. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 11. 
 101. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 33. 
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In response to world expectations,102 China finally joined the WTO on 
December 11, 2001.103 In doing so, China agreed to follow the WTO’s 
rules regarding trade,104 as participation is hinged on its compliance.105 
Members of the WTO are subject to a set “scope” or “minimum stan-
dards” of IPR legal protection.106 Through the WTO, China is bound to 
the important Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (“TRIPS”),107 which structures intellectual property rights’ 
protection with respect to trade globally.108 TRIPS guidelines establish a 
skeleton for intellectual property as it overlaps with trade,109 including 
incorporation of the Berne Convention’s standards for copyright110 and 
the Paris Convention’s scope for trademarks.111 Of particular relevance to 
China, TRIPS’ creation under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
                                                                                                                                     
 102. GANEA, supra note 39, at xiii. 
 103. WTO, Member Information, supra note 42. 
 104. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 307. 
 105. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 12. 
 106. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 11. TRIPS emerged from the GATT’s Uru-
guay Round, merging trade and intellectual property protection globally, and now exists 
as part of the WTO package. Beatrice Lindstrom, Note, Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An 
Analysis of Intellectual Property Provisions in Trade Agreements and Implications for 
Asia and the Pacific, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 917, 923 (2010). TRIPS requires WTO 
nations to observe the Berne, Paris, Rome, International [for the Protection of Perfor-
mers] Conventions, as well as the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated 
Circuits (IPIC Treaty). Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2010). 
 107. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 108. Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 
2010). 
 109. Notably, it establishes “most favored nation treatment” in Article 4, meaning no 
special incentives for a favorite trading nation. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, art. 4; 
see also WTO, Principles, supra note 57. The WTO explains that if you “[g]rant some-
one a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products) [] you 
have to do the same for all other WTO members.” However, this is a limited concept. Id. 
Similarly, TRIPS requires “national treatment” in Article 3, meaning that each nation 
must treat the parties as it would its own nationals. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, 
art. 3; see also WTO, Principles, supra note 57. “Member countries may not discriminate 
against nationals of one country and in favor of nationals of other countries, whether 
those other countries are WTO members or not.” Ugolini, supra note 21, at 455. Howev-
er, these guidelines are not to be confused with one’s IP rights being the same every-
where—in fact, they may not be recognized at all outside of one’s home nation, under the 
concept of territoriality. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 11. 
 110. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, art. 9. 
 111. Id. art. 15. 
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Trade (“GATT”) also allows developing nations “to use bargaining pow-
er and secure trade-offs in negotiating favourable terms.”112 In accor-
dance with TRIPS, China greatly improved its intellectual property pro-
tections113 and is technically in compliance with TRIPS standards.114 
China claims that it is in compliance through its enforcement actions as 
well.115 TRIPS features obligatory enforcement provisions.116 It creates a 
duty to exercise “effective action against any act of infringement of intel-
lectual property rights.”117 The breadth of these enforcement provisions 
runs from civil to criminal, administrative to judicial, and even to border 
control.118 TRIPS explains that administrative decisions may be subject 
to judicial review.119 However, under TRIPS there is no “obligation to 
put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general,”120 nor 
does it require redistribution of resources for IPR enforcement.121 Thus, 
although diverse enforcement mechanisms are established in TRIPS, a 
nation does not have any substantive duty to fund enforcement beyond 
that which already exists. With no required funding obligations, im-
provements to enforcement risk being nominal only. 
China’s legal opacity is in direct tension with its TRIPS obligations. 
TRIPS requires transparency for IPR enforcement as to “[l]aws and regu-
lations, and final judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general 
application.”122 China, however, only publishes a few of its judicial deci-
                                                                                                                                     
 112. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 12–13; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, 
pmbl. 
 113. See Kate Colpitts Hunter, Here There Be Pirates: How China is Meeting its IP 
Enforcement Obligations Under TRIPS, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 523, 533–40 (2007). For 
details on China’s domestic intellectual property laws, see infra notes 157–81 and ac-
companying text. 
 114. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 15. See infra notes 157–81 and accompanying 
text. 
 115. Konstantina K. Athanasakou, China IPR Enforcement: Hard as Steel or Soft as 
Tofu? Bringing the Question to the WTO Under TRIPS, 39 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 217, 234 
(2007). 
 116. Lindstrom, supra note 106, at 924. 
 117. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, art. 41, ¶ 1; see also Tobias Bender, How to 
Cope with China’s (Alleged) Failure to Implement the TRIPS Obligations on Enforce-
ment, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 230, 230 (2006). 
 118. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, pt. 3. 
 119. Id. at art. 41, ¶ 4. 
 120. Id. at art. 41, ¶ 5. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. art. 63, ¶ 1. 
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sions and shields its internal regulations from the public.123 Nonetheless, 
China may claim exemption through a loophole. Confidential informa-
tion may be omitted if it “would impede law enforcement or otherwise be 
contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commer-
cial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.”124 China could 
claim publishing judicial decisions regarding IPR violations would pro-
vide a roadmap for infringers. China’s adherence to transparency may be 
weak,125 but arguably so is the actual obligation if it features such a large 
exemption.126 
Even with enhanced enforcement provisions, TRIPS simply does not 
prohibit gray goods.127 TRIPS does provide measures for suspension of 
IP violative goods before they enter a market,128 but “does not require 
any WTO member to establish border measures for gray market goods, 
whether or not the goods are being imported from a country which is part 
of the same customs union as the country of importation.”129 Additional-
ly, Article 6 of TRIPS specifically addresses, or rather dodges, the doc-
trine of first sale or “exhaustion.” Regarding dispute settlements, TRIPS 
“shall [not] be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights.”130 China, with excuses from general IP enforcement and 
transparency, faces no specific barrier when it comes to gray goods under 
TRIPS, and thus its international obligations are likely impotent in the 
face of the gray market. Additionally, TRIPS’ avoidance of exhaustion 
suggests that the treaty as a whole is not applicable to parallel importa-
tion. Without specific provisions delineating TRIPS applicability, its ob-
ligations are not strong enough to change China’s gray market. 
                                                                                                                                     
 123. For a discussion of court transparency, see MARTIN DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE 
STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 106–08 (2009). 
 124. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, art. 63, ¶ 4. 
 125. Athanasakou, supra note 115, at 233. 
 126. China claims that its selected disclosures constitute important information and 
decisions, and thus it is in compliance. It claims that those decisions that remain undis-
closed are not included under TRIPS’ transparency obligations. For more information, 
see id. Additionally, judicial decisions may be increasingly important in China, and thus 
transparency may be improving. DIMITROV, supra note 123, at 106–07. 
 127. Ugolini, supra note 21, at 461. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 465. 
 130. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, art. 6. 
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B. International Scrutiny 
China faces “severe scrutiny”131 over its TRIPS and WTO Accession 
Protocol enforcement obligations,132 which could evolve into formal ac-
tion to curb parallel importation despite the aforementioned ambiguities. 
The United States, in particular, uses the WTO as a means of influencing 
China. For example, the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
creates an annual Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance.133 
The report from 2004 includes a proactive plan for IPR advancement in 
China, establishing goals of infringement reductions and more intense 
enforcement.134 China took this commission seriously, perhaps acknowl-
edging IPR’s gravity for the first time, and attacked rampant violations at 
the local level, a critical source of weakness in Chinese enforcement.135 
Although there was some progress from this collaboration, China still 
lacked the level of control desired by Western nations.136 
China could face a WTO suit regarding parallel importation. China’s 
WTO status channels its bilateral disagreements through the WTO dis-
pute settlement framework. 137  The Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(“DSU”) offers consultations, and if the issue remains unresolved, it then 
escalates into a panel review culminating in a report for the parties’ com-
                                                                                                                                     
 131. China again agreed to pursue transparency, most favored nation status, and na-
tional treatment in the WTO Accession Protocol. Athanasakou, supra note 115, at 230. 
 132. Id. at 217. 
 133. Archives, USTR.GOV, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-
publications/archives (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
 134. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 34. The agreement set out the following pertinent 
goals: 
(1) significantly reduce IPR infringement levels; 
(2) take steps by the end of 2004 to increase penalties of IPR violations . . . 
(3) crackdown on IPR violators by conducting nation-wide enforcement action 
and increasing customs enforcement actions . . . 
. . . . 
(5) launch a national IPR education campaign.” 
Id., (citing OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), 2004 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 59 (2004)). 
 135. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 34. 
 136. Id. at 35. 
 137. See A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#Understanding (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2010). 
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pliance.138 The United States has pursued the WTO dispute settlement 
process against China eleven times since China joined the WTO, and 
another four times with the European Union.139 The last case brought by 
the United States against China was decided in 2010,140 demonstrating 
commitment to this method. 
Although recent utilization of the DSU indicates that the U.S. has some 
faith in this method, decisions have been mixed and even unsuccessful 
for the United States. Most notably, the United States pursued DSU solu-
tions with China in 2007141 regarding China’s disposal and penalty thre-
shold for infringing goods, and IPR protection and enforcement.142 The 
United States claimed China dodged TRIPS by having an impracticably 
high eligibility threshold in implementing criminal sanctions against pi-
rates and IP violators.143 China defended its enforcement system, divid-
ing the infringements between high profile criminal cases and smaller 
administrative cases.144 Agreeing mostly with China, the WTO did find 
that China’s auctions of contraband essentially pushed the items into the 
stream of commerce again.145 The United States cited another claim con-
cerning China’s lack of copyright protection for banned works. The 
WTO found that China violated TRIPS by denying copyright protection 
to certain works, even though China may prohibit the works.146 Although 
the United States did not achieve its desired outcome, its small win in 
                                                                                                                                     
 138. Parties also have the option to seek alternate settlement arrangements (arbitration, 
etc.) and there is an appellate process. Id. 
 139. Disputes by Country/Territory, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm (last visited Mar. 
10, 2011). Compare this to India’s four times and the United Kingdom’s three times. Id. 
 140. This case was over car parts. Id.; see also Elizabeth Williamson & Tom Barkley, 
U.S. Beats China in Tire Fight, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 13, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703727804576017473322868118.html. 
This is not without irony, as one of the key cases in Chinese parallel importation is Mi-
chelin regarding tires. The United States also requested consultations three more times in 
2010. China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds340_e.htm (last visited May 28, 
2011). 
 141. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362 (Apr. 16, 2008); see also Athanasakou, supra 
note 115, at 236. 
 142. Athanasakou, supra note 115, at 218. 
 143. Peter K. Yu, The US-China WTO Cases Explained, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., 
Oct. 2009, available at http://www.peteryu.com/managingip_362.pdf. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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this case and success in later ones suggest that it will likely pursue DSU 
under the WTO again.   
The United States clearly takes China’s treaty compliance seriously 
and uses WTO disputes as a way to mold China’s intellectual property 
protection. The United States International Trade Commission continues 
to monitor China’s intellectual property infringements and responses.147 
With Costco v. Omega’s stalemate further muddying the right of first 
sale in the United States,148 the issue of parallel importation is about to 
explode.149 A dissatisfied United States (or any other IPR rich nation) 150 
could pursue WTO suit, despite TRIPS’ explicit exclusion of exhaustion, 
under the veil of pure copyright or trademark law. In fact, the U.S. de-
clared in the 2010 Special 301 Report151 that it “will continue pursuing 
the resolution of WTO-related disputes announced in previous Special 
301 reviews and determinations,”152 which includes, of course, issues 
with China. 
Beyond the WTO, China could also face sanctions from the United 
States, among others. 153  The United States’ 2008–2009 Chamber of 
                                                                                                                                     
 147. Gross, supra note 56. 
 148. Supreme Court Rebuffs Costco in Copyright Challenge, supra note 31. 
 149. For discussion of Costco v. Omega, see Samuel Brooks, Note, Battling Gray 
Markets through Copyright Law: Omega, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 2010 
B.Y.U.L. REV. 19 (2010); Daniel Fisher, Costco v. Omega is About Much More than 
Cheap Watches, FORBES FULL DISCLOSURE BLOG (Nov. 5, 2010, 1:01 PM), 
http://blogs.forbes.com/danielfisher/2010/11/05/costco-v-omega-is-about-much-more-
than-cheap-watches. 
 150. See Bender, supra note 117, at 240. 
 151. This report is prepared under the authorization of the Trade Act of 1974 §182, 19 
U.S.C. 2242 (2010); see also JOHN T. MASTERSON, INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARKS AND 
COPYRIGHTS: ENFORCEMENT AND MANAGEMENT 18–19 (2004). The report identifies 
countries that “deny adequate and effective” IPR protection or “deny fair and equitable 
market access” to Americans with IPR of concern “priority foreign countries” including 
those with policies that have an “adverse impact (actual or potential)” on American 
goods. 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2010). The 301 report operates under the blessing of the WTO, 
and the Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act even concluded that fully compliant members 
may rightfully be candidates for 301 reports. After IPR-threatening nations have been 
identified, an investigation must transpire under provided parameters. Upon the report’s 
completion, an affirmative decision will be treated as the basis for potential retaliation. 
MASTERSON, supra, at 19–20. 
 152. AMBASSADOR RON KIRK, OFFICE OF THE USTR, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 16, 
[hereinafter USTR 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT], available at 
http://bangkok.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/2010_special_301_report.pdf. 
 153. See id. The negative attention does not come exclusively from the United States, 
however. The European Union has been nearly as concerned, and Japan is afraid of the 
risk of “serious damage” posed by China’s IPR laxness. Athanasakou, supra note 115, at 
220–21. “TRIPS-plus” agreements, bilateral efforts to provide protection beyond TRIPS’ 
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Commerce Report recommended that China be more vigilant on regional 
violative “hotspots,” allocate greater resources for IPR enforcement, 
launch criminal investigations focused on the wealthy and the powerful, 
and focus on “transborder cases” of violative goods (specific to gray 
goods) and “potentially dangerous products” 154  (arguably, unscreened 
tires that create peril for drivers). The Chamber of Commerce com-
plained in this report that in spite of the Chinese government’s constant 
actions, very little has actually changed.155 However, more aggressive 
steps from the United States and other countries may create significant 
and detrimental trade tensions.156 
C. Contemporary Chinese Law as is Pertinent to Parallel Importation 
While China has only had a few decades to absorb Western IPR, 
“[m]ost Western lawyers find the [Chinese] body of [intellectual proper-
ty] law comprehensive, systematic and wholly familiar.” 157  Mainland 
China’s national laws do not ban nor restrict parallel importation.158 
However, pursuant to worldwide pressure, China developed a substantial 
IPR statutory scheme which may be used to support anti-gray market 
claims, notably the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China in 
1982 and the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China in 
1990.159 
                                                                                                                                     
boundaries, have sprouted in an effort to protect trade. Lindstrom, supra note 106, at 919. 
Many TRIPS-plus “preferential trade agreements” cater specifically to industry in the 
stronger country, including parallel importation problems. Id. at 918, 985–65. However, 
stricter agreements may stoke trade tensions as well. Id. at 965. 
 154. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CHINA’S WTO IMPLEMENTATION AND OTHER 
ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THE U.S.-CHINA COMMERCIAL 
RELATIONSHIP 28 (2008–2009), available at 
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/international/asia/china/files/chinawtosingl
epages.pdf. 
 155. See id. at 8. 
 156. Colpitts Hunter, supra note 113, at 548–51. 
 157. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 14. 
 158. Angela Wang & Co., Parallel Importation of Goods in Hong Kong and Mainland 
China: Part II- Mainland China), HG.ORG (Apr. 30, 2008), 
http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=5150. Hong Kong, although increasingly absorbent of 
mainland China’s policies, has its own laws regarding parallel importation. See Alison L. 
Morr, Comment, Hong Kong’s Copyright Ordinance: How the Ban on Parallel Imports 
Affects the U.S. Entertainment Industry and Hong Kong’s Free Market, 21 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 393, 399 (1999). 
 159. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 66. The Copyright Law was amended in 2001. Id. 
While contemporary Chinese trademark law originated in 1982, it was most recently 
updated in 2001 with implementing regulations in 2002. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, 
at 15. China has been revising this law since 2008. EU-China Workshop on Revision of 
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Chinese trademark law does not expressly prohibit parallel importa-
tion.160 However, there are potential protections within the statutory text 
for those with trademarks registered in China, via Articles 50 and 52 of 
the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China. Article 52(1) ex-
plains that trademark violations include “[using a mark] that is identical 
or similar to another’s registered trademark on identical or similar goods, 
thereby misleading the public.”161 While it is not intuitive that one would 
be misled by authentic products, goods entering unauthorized channels 
may not go through traditional safety screening processes.162 
Article 52 details the broad array of acts that could constitute an in-
fringement: 
(1) Use of a trademark that is the same as or similar to a registered 
trademark for identical or similar goods without permission of the 
trademark registrant; 
(2) Sale of any goods that have infringed the exclusive right to use any 
registered trademark; 
. . . .  
(4) Change of any trademark of a registrant without the registrant’s 
consent, and selling goods bearing such replaced trademark on the 
market; or 
(5) Other acts that have caused any other damage to another’s exclu-
sive right to use a registered trademark.163 
                                                                                                                                     
the Trademark Law, Beijing (Oct. 27–29, 2010), NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG., 
http://www.ipr2.org/index.php?view=article&id=1292%3Aeu-china-workshop-on-
revision-of-the-trademark-law&option=com_content&Itemid=235 (last visited May 29, 
2011). The patent law was also added in 1984 as part of this statutory scheme. CHEUNG, 
supra note 32, at 66. For details on specific provisions, see GANEA, supra note 39. 
 160. Paul B. Birden, Trademark Protection in China: Trends and Directions, 18 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 431, 472 (1996). Chinese law prohibits any trademark use or 
registration if “a reproduction, imitation, or translation of another person’s trademark 
not registered in China and likely to cause confusion.” (emphasis added). CHINA IP 
PRIMER, supra note 20, at 18. 
 161. (中华人民共和国商标法实施条例) [Implementing Provisions for the Trademark 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 3, 2002, 
effective Sept. 23, 2002), art. 50(1). 
 162. For more on this, see infra notes 217–22 and accompanying text. 
 163. (中华人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by Standing Comm. of the Fifth Nat’l People’s Cong. Aug. 23, 1982, effec-
tive Dec. 1 2001), art. 52 [hereinafter Trademark Law (P.R.C.)]. Paragraph (1) of Article 
52 has been used as the grant in the past, but (5) is curiously broad. See Protection 
Against Parallel Imports in China, VIVIEN CHAN & CO. CHINA NEWSL., July 2010, 
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Paragraph (4) explicitly prohibits rebranding a trademark, which is seen 
during parallel importation,164 although commentators believe that this is 
only targeting “passing off” one brand as another.165 While paragraphs 
(1) and (2) are straightforward, (5) provides a gaping opportunity to ar-
gue a nontraditional case of infringement; “damage,”166 which is unde-
fined, is sufficient to constitute infringement.167 Arguably, lack of control 
over pricing and distribution channels may damage the interests of a 
trademark holder.168 However, an investigation into the legislative intent 
of Article 52(5) has shown that the act did not include parallel importa-
tion as a type of infringement.169 Without proof that it was deliberately 
excluded, though, 52(5) may still offer a cause of action. 
Copyright protection is sometimes pursued for gray market mitigation, 
as trademark is often inadequate.170 However, China’s copyright protec-
tions are no savior as they lack a general prohibition on importation of 
copyright infringing goods.171 Although imperfect, it does provide a right 
of distribution,172 which was the right used to pursue Costco v. Omega in 
the United States.173 Another possible source of protection is §15(2) of 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.vcclawservices.com/sources/publications/vcc_newsletter_2010_04.pdf [he-
reinafter Protection Against Parallel Imports in China]. 
 164. PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA, supra note 19, at 28. This simply means affixing a 
new trademark on a protected good. Id. 
 165. Id. Passing off constitutes “selling goods of another produce with one’s own trade 
mark without consent.” Id. Thus, it is essentially marketing another’s product as one’s 
own. 
 166. Other translations have used the term “prejudice.” Id. 
 167. Laurie Self & Jason Ma, Amending China’s Trademark Law, IP WORLD, June 
2009, at 20. 
 168. As previously discussed, trademark owners are representing a product to be a 
certain quality. Bypassing quality control tests, potential commingling with counterfeit 
products, and a possible lack of prestige by less expensive pricing, all potentially injure 
the trademark holder’s business. Additionally, forcing a business to compete against itself 
due to underselling may damage projected profits. See Hintz, supra note 65, at 1189–90, 
for more discussion. 
 169. PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA, supra note 19, at 28. 
 170. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 213. China’s copyright legislation is based on the 1990 
law, updated in 2001, and implementing regulations in 2002. FENG, supra note 88, at 
lvii–lviii. It was most recently updated in 2010. 中华人民共和国著作权法 [Copyright 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
Cong., Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Copyright Law (P.R.C.)]. 
 171. Between Section 46’s eleven enumerated infringing acts and Section 47’s eight, 
parallel importation is not touched upon. PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA, supra note 19, at 
30. 
 172. “The right to make the original or reproduced version of a work available to the 
public by sale or donation” Copyright Law (P.R.C.), art. 10, ¶ 6. 
 173. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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the Provisions on the Implementation of International Copyright Trea-
ties, § 15(2), which states that a copyright holder may prohibit importa-
tion of his or her works if the originating country fails to offer protec-
tion.174 Additionally, Article 4 states that “copyright owners shall not 
violate the . . . laws and shall not harm the public interest. The State shall 
supervise and administrate the publication or dissemination of works in 
accordance with the law.”175 The phrase “public interest” could support 
its application to the gray market, but a look at the phrase’s evolution 
suggests that the legislature likely intended to address censorship, not 
parallel importation.176 With no statutory acknowledgement of the gray 
market177 or exhaustion,178 and broad caveats for governmental discre-
tion, copyright protections for parallel goods have no substantial inhibi-
tion. These fragments reflect how IPR protection for parallel importation 
in China is often a piecemeal, industry-by-industry method. 
The trademark laws provide for civil remedy. With that, compensation 
or damages are available179 and administrative agencies may seize and 
destroy infringing items and tools.180 Similar procedures exist for copy-
right infringement. Courts and administrative agencies may confiscate 
items and tools of infringement, with “damages of up to RMB 500,000” 
and the possibility of preliminary injunction.181 
In order to implement these laws, China created administrative bureaus 
and substantial penalties.182 These administrative organizations help fill 
                                                                                                                                     
 174. 实施国际著作权条约的规定 [Provisions on the Implementation of International 
Copyright Treaties] (promulgated Sept. 25, 1992, effective Sept. 30, 1992), art. 15, ¶ 2. 
 175. Copyright Law (P.R.C.), art. 4. 
 176. 1990’s version stated, “Works that are prohibited by law from publication and 
dissemination shall not be protected by this Law. A copyright owner in exercising his 
copyright shall not violate the Constitution or the law, nor injure public interest.” Copy-
right Law (P.R.C.), (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Seventh Nat’l People’s 
Cong. Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991), art. 4. This evolved into “[w]orks that are 
prohibited from publication or dissemination, as specified by law, shall not be protected 
under this Law. In exercising copyrights, the owners thereof shall not violate the Consti-
tution or any other laws, and shall not harm the public interest.” Copyright Law (P.R.C.), 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Seventh Nat’l People’s Cong. Oct. 27, 2001, 
effective Oct. 27, 2001), art. 4. 
 177. Angela Wang & Co., supra note 158. 
 178. Zhao Ye & Xu Jing, Software Resale, A Copyright Puzzle, IP BULLETIN (2008), 
available at http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=Software-Resale-A-
Copyright-Puzzle&language=en. 
 179. FENG, supra note 88, at 300. 
 180. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 28. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Athanasakou, supra note 115, at 222. 
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the gaps created by a “fledgling court system.”183 In the odd web spun 
from a changing government and fractured governance with weight held 
by localities, it is not terribly surprising that these administrative offices 
are “subordinate to the local governments on the county level.”184 This 
fragmentation is a significant hurdle for those pursuing claims. While 
there are statutory copyright and trademark protections that may be ap-
plicable to the gray market, Chinese enforcement is patchy at best. 
III. CHINA’S ENFORCEMENT FAILURE 
Chinese IPR enforcement is lacking. Although China claims progress, 
79% of counterfeit seizures at U.S. borders originate in China.185 With 
timid and infrequent administrative fines, infringers see administrative 
actions as simply “a cost of doing business.”186 Additionally, China im-
poses an extremely high financial and volume threshold before initiating 
criminal proceedings.187 China must overcome several hurdles in order to 
improve enforcement of IPR, including geographical size, heterogeneous 
cultures, local protectionism, and decentralization.188 Due to fragmenta-
tion and scale, the country faces “schizophrenic” and inconsistent local 
regulations.189 China gestures at enforcement but has not yet adequately 
addressed the IPR disaster within its borders. 190  The judicial branch 
tracks the patterns of what little enforcement does exist. Copyright deci-
sions uphold the idea of first sale while trademark decisions are patchy 
and inconsistent as to whether parallel importation of trademark pro-
tected goods will be seen as trademark infringement. 
A. China’s Recent Judicial Decisions Regarding the Gray Market 
Although judicial decisions may illuminate what truly occurs within 
China’s borders, it is important to note that China’s legal system is uni-
quely structured. Chinese case law has no formal weight, but “exem-
plary” decisions do guide lower courts.191 Scholar Martin K. Dimitrov 
speculates that judicial precedent is increasingly important as China 
                                                                                                                                     
 183. GANEA, supra note 39, at xiv. China’s judiciary was remodeled for WTO acces-
sion. Bender, supra note 117, at 235. 
 184. GANEA, supra note 39, at xiv. 
 185. Gross, supra note 56 (citing a statistic from The Business Software Alliance). 
 186. USTR, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, at 20–21 (2010). 
 187. Id. at 20. 
 188. Yu, Three Questions, supra note 56, at 421. 
 189. Id. at 423. 
 190. This is not to say that China has done absolutely nothing. The 2010 301 Report 
lauds the recent Chinese crackdown on piracy. USTR, supra note 186, at 19. 
 191. FENG, supra note 88, at 33. 
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grows.192 By its nature, case law is reflective of China’s true application 
of its statutes, a pure example of the state of enforcement. However, case 
law is typically not accessible.193 This means that China essentially pre-
vents those outside the court system from any clear view of enforcement 
of its statutes and international obligations, perhaps in violation of 
TRIPS transparency requirements. 
Applicable copyright cases are scant.194 However, in 2008, China de-
cided a case regarding exhaustion and copyright within its borders. 
Shanghai Shanjun Industrial Ltd. & Zheng Feng v. Shanghai Jiliang 
Software Technology Ltd.195 (“Zheng Feng”) involved legally obtained 
software that was resold twice after its first sale. In a novel move, the 
Shanghai High People’s Court applied the theory of exhaustion.196 The 
court declared, “[o]nce the copyright work . . . [is] initially sold, or gifted 
to the public under the license of the copyright owner, the copyright 
owner will no longer enjoy the right to control further sale of the work or 
its copies.”197 This concept has also been put forth by Beijing’s High 
People’s Court,198 implying consistency throughout China regarding ex-
                                                                                                                                     
 192. DIMITROV, supra note 123, at 107. 
 193. Some cases are published in the PRC Supreme People’s Court Gazette. Id. at 32. 
 194. At time of publication of this (cited) guide just six years ago, there were no deci-
sions pertinent to the parallel market. PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA, supra note 19, at 31. 
However, since then, it appears at least one has occurred. 
 195. Shanghai Shanjun Indust. Ltd. & Zheng Feng v. Shanghai Jiliang Software Tech. 
Ltd., (Shanghai Interm. People’s Ct., May 14, 2008), 
http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=18193. (This source is in Chinese.) 
As China does not publish many of its cases, the four important cases discussed in this 
Note have imperfect citations. As the details of the cases have been explained by experts, 
this Note uses the most formal names and citations used in the experts’ discussions. 
 196. Zhao Ye & Xu Jing, supra note 178. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Answers of the Beijing High People’s Court to Certain Questions Regarding the 
Trial of Cases Involving Copyright Disputes, Beijing High People’s Court, Jing Gao Fa 
Fa [1996] No. 460. 
18. Is a person who has purchased the reproductions of a work distributed upon 
authorization of the copyright owner allowed to resell such reproductions with-
out the consent of the copyright owner? 
Answer: Once a certain volume of reproductions of a work has been distributed 
upon authorization of the copyright owner, the copyright owner’s sale right in 
such volume of reproductions of the work shall be deemed to have been used 
up and shall be prohibited from being used any longer. With respect to repro-
ductions of the work distributed upon authorization of the copyright owner, 
others’ resale of such reproductions purchased by them shall be exempted from 
consent of the copyright owner. Id. 
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haustion. However, future cases will be necessary to see if copyright ex-
haustion is truly emerging as Chinese policy. 
Trademark, on the other hand, appears to be growing as a method of 
protection against parallel importation in China. Shanghai Unilever Co. 
Ltd. v. Commercial Importing and Exporting Trading Co. of Guanghzou 
Economic Technology Developing District, Hui Zhong Fa Shi Chu Zi 
(“LUX”)199 was the first parallel importation case ever tried in China, to 
mixed results.200 LUX, a popular soap brand, faced parallel importation 
issues in mainland China. In September of 1997 and again in 1998, the 
plaintiff secured appropriate licensing with Unilever for use of the LUX 
trademark in China.201 The plaintiff publicized its newly obtained license 
and filed with the State Trademark Office and General Administration of 
Customs.202 In 1999, customs officials in Guangdong seized nearly 900 
boxes of LUX soap created for the Thai market, en route to China from 
Thailand. 203  The plaintiff brought suit against the parallel importer, 
claiming that it violated the company’s exclusive right to use its trade-
mark, and asked for the court to enjoin the defendant from importing and 
selling LUX soap, apologize publically, and reimburse the plaintiff for its 
losses.204 
The parallel importer claimed that since the soap truly was authentic, 
there could be no violation. Additionally, the parallel importer claimed 
that this case was a “typical” parallel import instance, with properly 
trademark protected goods intended for sale in Thailand.205 The court 
rejected this argument, saying it lacked sufficient documentation of 
proper licensing for Thailand, much less China.206 It held that because 
the trademark was published, it violated trademark law by failing to 
show that the product originated from the owner of the trademark or that 
such importation was approved by the trademark owner.207 This lack of 
                                                                                                                                     
 199. Shanghai Unilever Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Imp. & Exp. Trading Co. of Gua-
nghzou Econ. Tech. Developing Dist., Hui Zhong Fa Shi Chu Zi (Guangzhou Interm. 
People’s Ct., June 1999). A more developed citation was unavailable at the time this Note 
was drafted. 
 200. Yang Jinqi, Trademark Infringement in Parallel Import, 62 CHINA PATENTS AND 
TRADEMARKS (IP QUARTERLY), no. 3, July 2000, at 31; see also PARALLEL IMPORTS IN 
ASIA, supra note 19, at 28–30. 
 201. Jinqi, supra note 200. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Angela Wang & Co., supra note 158. 
 205. PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA, supra note 19, at 29. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Jinqi, supra note 200, at 32. 
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authorization was fatal.208 The court ordered three remedies: financial 
compensation of LUX’s loss, an order to stop importation of LUX soap, 
and the court added that the defendant must issue a public apology in the 
regional newspaper.209 
Critics of the decision were dissatisfied by the way the court dodged 
the question of whether parallel importation is illegal under trademark 
law.210 By denying that this case was actual parallel importation, the 
court left ample room for maneuvering. The showmanship around the 
decision, namely the public apology, may indicate that the court wanted 
to make a grand public statement regarding Chinese enforcement. 
However grand the LUX conclusion may have been, in 2000, the Fa-
huayilin Trading Co. v. Beijing Century Hengyuan Tech. & Trading 
Ltd.211 (“An’ge”) case deviated from its course.212 The court in An’ ge 
addressed similar arguments as in LUX, that the plaintiff’s exclusive li-
cense was violated and that this constituted unfair competition. The 
court, instead of following the logic delineated by LUX, held that the de-
fendants were just employing typical legal business operations, agreeing 
with the defendant’s assertion that the parallel importer followed proper 
procedure.213 The judge explained that a contract between two parties 
could not be imposed upon a third party.214 Additionally, highlighting a 
loophole in the statutes, the judge stressed that nothing says that the 
people who buy the products “must be the direct consumers or users.”215 
Essentially, Beijing’s An’Ge authorized like situations only with respect 
to wholesale purchasers, not the full scope of parallel importation.216 
The 2009 Michelin217 decision created further discomfort in the treat-
ment of trademark infringement by gray goods. The Michelin Group 
sued two tire dealers who were importing, without permission, real Mi-
                                                                                                                                     
 208. See Protection Against Parallel Imports in China, supra note 163. 
 209. Jinqi, supra note 200, at 32. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Fahuayilin Trading Co. v Beijing Century Hengyuan Tech. and Trading Ltd. (Bei-
jing, 2002). A more complete citation was unavailable at the time this Note was drafted. 
See also Grace Li, China, PHARMACEUTICAL TRADEMARKS 2009—A GLOBAL GUIDE 7, 8 
(2009), available at 
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/issues/Article.ashx?g=4e74f91e-6b26-44f0-a03f-
286269affea5. 
 212. Protection Against Parallel Imports in China, supra note 163. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Li, supra note 211. 
 217. Michelin Grp v. Tan Guoqiang & Ou Ca (Changsha Interm. People’s Ct Apr. 24, 
2009). 
1102 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:3 
chelin tires.218 The court held that, similarly to LUX, the trademark in-
cluded right of importation. However, the decision turned on the fact that 
the Michelin trademark implied that the tires underwent official quality 
control testing.219 The gray tires entered China indirectly and thus were 
never subject to government testing via the China Compulsory Product 
Certification (3C) system.220 Without this quality control, these tires were 
essentially different products. The court pointed out that subsequently, 
the tires were technically illegal.221 The court was concerned that un-
knowing consumers would then attribute any faulty tires to Michelin, 
thus damaging the trademark and company’s reputation.222 
Michelin seems to build further support for trademark protection as a 
barrier to the gray market. However, the logic of the decision may have 
created a significant loophole. If a product is not directly related to safe-
ty, and does not receive mandatory tests, it is unclear if it would face a 
similar barrier. 
In the aftermath of these three trademark cases, it appears that the Chi-
nese judiciary is trying to show some support for the protection of inter-
national trademarks. However, the quality loophole, legality of parallel 
goods, lack of judicial weight, and general unavailability of published 
cases make application of trademark law subject to whim. Additionally, 
LUX’s newspaper apology appears suspiciously cosmetic, publically an-
nouncing a rights holder’s success. It is possible that China may just be 
diverting attention from an agenda of development and satisfying one of 
the world’s largest economies. Paired with the apparent enforcement of 
exhaustion, it seems that gray goods face limited restrictions under intel-
lectual property laws in China. Rights holders’ success appears to be at 
the discretion of the judiciary. 
B. Potential Reasons for Weak IPR Enforcement and Disincentive to 
Prevent Parallel Imports 
Placing the above cases in context, China’s relationship with IPR en-
forcement is tenuous for many reasons. Although development is often 
said to require IPR,223 this may not be the case in China. Experts conflict 
                                                                                                                                     
 218. Protection Against Parallel Imports in China, supra note 163; see also Fu Haiy-
ing, Trademark Infringement in Parallel Importation, CHINA LAW INSIGHT (Oct. 21 
2010), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2010/10/articles/intellectual-property/trademark-
infringement-in-parallel-importation. 
 219. Protection Against Parallel Imports in China, supra note 163. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. ALIKHAN, supra note 84, at 1. 
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on the value of such protections to developing economies. Innovation is a 
key element to a blossoming economy, and continued growth may rely 
on innovative advancements.224  Contrary to the traditional belief that 
there exists a “positive correlation between high protection and [research 
and development] . . . Overprotective terms may actually limit innova-
tion.”225 With enormous resources and quick change, China has seen 
“various truncated, if not zigzag, ways of development.”226 Thus, it is not 
surprising that it may experience growth without traditional IPR protec-
tions. However, this is not unique to China. The United States, arguably 
China’s biggest critic, did not sign the Berne Convention in 1886 with 
the rest of the Western world,227  leaving famed authors like Charles 
Dickens underprotected by contemporary standards.228 Instead, the Unit-
ed States protected its developing economy at the detriment of interna-
tional IPR holders.229 The United States officially joined the Berne con-
vention over a century later in 1988, at that time with a ferocious and 
long dominant economy.230 
Some argue that China will correct its IPR policies when the economy 
is stronger,231 as the United States did. Primarily, large companies born 
of such a vibrant economy will require their own protections.232 Perhaps 
China is already at this stage. After winning the opportunity to host the 
Chinese 2008 summer games, China created Olympics-specific laws, 
enabling criminal punishment for the unauthorized selling of products 
with the Olympics logo.233 China finally had something to lose with lax 
IPR protections.234 However, even with new protections, new laws were 
                                                                                                                                     
 224. Lindstrom, supra note 106, at 921. 
 225. Id. 
 226. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at xiii. 
 227. Many nations signed the original, with official implementation in 1887. Contract-
ing Parties—Berne Convention, supra note 88. 
 228. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 14. 
 229. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 307. 
 230. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1989). 
 231. See CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 20–21. 
 232. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 307. 
 233. Geoffrey Fowler, China’s Logo Crackdown, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2005, at B1; 
see also Doris E. Long, Protection in China, Post-Olympics, NAT’L L.J. (N.Y.), Aug. 18, 
2008, available at http://www.jmls.edu/academics/ip_law/NLJ%20-
%20Doris%20Long%20IP%20China%20Article%20Aug%2018%2008.pdf). China made 
“[a] significant advance in IP protection by broadening the potential administrative ave-
nues for relief and providing a more rational basis for determining fines and penalties.” 
Id. 
 234. Elizabeth Ferrill, Clearing the Swamp for Intellectual Property Harmonization: 
Understanding and Appreciating the Barriers to Full TRIPS Compliance for Industrializ-
ing and Non-Industrialized Countries, 15 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137, 169 (2007). 
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no match for China’s “serious and entrenched” 235 IPR problems, and 
Olympic products were still counterfeited, although to a lesser degree.236 
Regardless of the potential governmental changes ahead, China faces 
tremendous cultural roadblocks. Chinese communist rule imposed a 
moral and philosophical understanding that, “[a]uthors thus create lite-
rary and artistic works for the welfare of the State, rather than for the 
purpose of generating economic benefits for themselves.”237 The sin of 
ownership paired with the Maoist suppression of independent thought 
and the criticism of the “intelligentsia”238 created a notion of distrust and 
disrespect of the Western concept of ownership. In particular, all inven-
tions that would be patentable by individuals in today’s society belonged 
to the government during that era, and China recognized nominal trade-
mark abilities and no copyright protection.239 
Additionally, China’s Confucian roots pose a far deeper stumbling 
block.240 “Imitation and reproduction of ideas, art and scholarship are 
considered tokens of honor and respect . . . ,” thus, “ . . . protection of 
intellectual property rights is not a concept that first easily into a Confu-
cian society, where copying is often and integral part of the learning 
process.”241 Additionally, the remains of Confucianism may have created 
an “entrenched tradition of regarding laws as an inefficient, arbitrary, and 
cumbersome instrument for governance.”242 The Chinese culture that met 
                                                                                                                                     
 235. Yu, Three Questions, supra note 56, at 420–21. 
 236. Long, supra note 233. 
 237. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 18. “Maoist” refers to Mao Zedong, who 
led China as the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China during the communist era. 
See JONATHAN CLEMENTS, MAO ZEDONG 91–93 (2006). “Intelligentsia” refers to the intel-
lectual social class. See ALFORD, supra note 79, at 63–65. 
 238. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 18–19 (discussing ALFORD, supra note 79, 
at 63–64). 
 239. Ferrill, supra note 234, at 157. 
 240. Confucius, the philosopher, inspired Chinese lifestyle for “more than two millen-
nia.” Confucianism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/132104/Confucianism, (last visited Dec. 20, 
2010). For a detailed discussion as it pertains to this Note, see ALFORD, supra note 79, at 
19–28. 
 241. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 20. 
 242. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 24. “The Chinese lived by the concept of li 
(rites), rather than the concept of fa (law).” Id. Under this conceptual perspective, laws 
are not “‘a detailed, comprehensive and self-containing rule system, justifiable on ideo-
logical as well as jurisprudential grounds, with coherent principles and well defined con-
cepts.’ They also can be ‘incomplete, incoherent, ideologically compromising, as well as 
broadly and vaguely termed pending further administrative and judicial experience in its 
implementation.’” Id. at 25 (quoting FENG, supra note 88, at 11). Additionally, laws are 
often flexible and can be ephemeral. Id. 
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the world just thirty-two years ago was bred to be intellectual property 
protection averse. 
Another facet complicating Chinese compliance is that the Chinese 
economy is arguably too big,243 with too much growth, too fast.244 The 
most populous nation in the world is suddenly faced with consumerism 
transformative of “. . . China’s economic landscape as well as con-
test[ing] Chinese people’s acceptance and compliance of the global 
norms.”245 Since China joined the market societies of the world, “and the 
call for ‘getting rich is glorious,’” it has been forced to partner its cultural 
norms (discussed above) with “the thrust of the ‘get rich first’ mentali-
ty.”246 This economic momentum paired with traditional IPR averse val-
ues threatens Western IPR notions and protection. 
Beyond the fact that China’s current stage of society may be incompat-
ible with IPR protection, the Western world does not provide productive 
guidance on parallel importation. Costco v. Omega sent an unclear mes-
sage about the United States’ position on parallel importation, shirking a 
declaration or disavowal of the international application of the first sale 
doctrine.247 Additionally, as Peter Yu points out, between Canal Street’s 
knock-off watches and College Hill laptops playing illegally downloaded 
mp3s, the United States arguably doesn’t prioritize IPR enforcement it-
self.248 Accordingly, IPR protection is low on the United States-China 
agenda, below nuclear nonproliferation and currency exchange, or “at the 
top of the second list.”249 If IPR protection itself is secondary, parallel 
importation is tertiary despite economic interests. Logically, the quality 
of the U.S.’ persuasion on this topic is likely commensurate with its pri-
oritization.250 
Paired with jurisdictional confusion and decentralization,251 Confucian 
and communist beliefs impede IPR protection. The nation’s rapid growth 
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further hinders IPR protection, but may eventually incentivize copyright 
and trademarks enforcement. Conflicting messages from the United 
States do not clarify the issue’s importance. Thus, a new strategy is ne-
cessary. 
IV. LOOKING FORWARD 
The scarcity and inconsistent nature of China’s published judicial deci-
sions indicates that its IPR enforcement is still virtually nonexistent when 
compared to the number of violations. Thus, pragmatically, the problem 
of gray goods in China should be addressed directly. This requires a two 
pronged action: enhanced Chinese IPR enforcement and creation of a 
specific action for gray goods across borders. 
There is a patchwork of suggested solutions throughout the interna-
tional community. Some solutions focus on China’s internal growth. Yu 
suggests increasing public awareness; however, there have already been 
significant advancements toward educating the public in China,252 to lit-
tle avail. Most suggestions require international involvement. Some have 
suggested establishing an international venue for disputes addressing 
intellectual property.253 This may not be successful as many countries 
would have to “surrender” significant sovereignty.254 Emerging and de-
veloping economies like China would likely not join for protectionist 
development reasons,255 undermining the purpose. Other proposed solu-
tions include taxing imports on all intellectual property to build a fund 
for enforcement,256 but this penalizes creation and does not address cul-
tural attitudes. Additionally, there will be difficulty convincing emerging 
economies to use this money for the sole purpose of IPR enforcement, 
when larger problems (infrastructure, energy, etc.) loom. It has also been 
suggested that the wealthy economies should subsidize enforcement of 
IPR in foreign nations,257 a strange bedfellow of technology transfer. 
This would penalize Western creation in favor of developing nations’ 
native IPR, and would face similar problems as the previous solutions. 
                                                                                                                                     
 252. Peter K. Yu, Conference-U.S.-China Trade: Opportunities and Challenges: Still 
Dissatisfied After All These Years: Intellectual Property, Post-WTO China, and the 
Avoidable Cycle of Futility, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143, 152 (2005). 
 253. Creer, supra note 37, at 242. Creer suggests that an international court would 
force emerging nations, like China, to be measured by the same standard as the rest of the 
world. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See Lindstrom, supra note 106, at 921–22. 
 256. Creer, supra note 37, at 242. 
 257. Id. at 243. 
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Even if the nations of the world embraced such solutions, these ideas 
miss the essence of the problem: the gray market is not illegal as it exists 
without trademark or significant copyright violations, and thus needs to 
be targeted directly. The deliberate distance from the gray market in 
TRIPS arguably allows parallel importation. WTO member countries 
need not adopt border measures as to “goods put on the market in anoth-
er country with the consent of the right holder.”258 Additionally, TRIPS 
does not require members to “devote more resources to intellectual prop-
erty enforcement than other areas of law enforcement.”259 Without mus-
cle from the strongest applicable treaty, China’s behavior is unlikely to 
change. 
The logic is very simple: make parallel importation illegal globally. 
However, the simplicity of such an argument faces fatal hurdles. It is 
doubtful that the world will agree universally on all the facets of the pa-
rallel importation problem, as the United States has no clear official poli-
cy and international treaties deliberately sidestep the issue. Even if con-
sensus is reached, it will take time to get the many trading nations of the 
world to literally “sign on” to such a treaty. Thus, it must be approached 
from a more creative angle. 
Pragmatically, the United States and other nations need to be forth-
coming about their concern regarding parallel products. As parallel im-
ports mingle with black market goods in the gray market, the former are 
arguably less damaging than counterfeited goods, and thus may be priori-
tized below counterfeits. In the interim, however, major companies are 
losing significant sums of money. While this may just be the downside of 
a global economy, if the corporations of the United States, European Un-
ion, and others are so highly impacted, the parent nations must be proac-
tive. Companies should be vigilant themselves, and proactively pursue 
existing enforcement mechanisms,260 but further international trade nego-
tiations must transpire. 
To effectively address parallel importation, the United States, Japan, 
Australia, and China, or ideally all of the major trading nations (with es-
sential Chinese participation), must create a treaty, targeting gray goods, 
through the avenue of trademark protection. This treaty must use explicit 
language, stating that such violations in pursuit of the gray market, in 
excess of an agreed amount, will be subject to a specific and uniform 
punitive trademark violation/parallel import tariff. With internationally 
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agreed price equalization, a limitation to right of first sale could be pre-
served if a nation so chooses, but governments could temper the effect of 
gray goods on industry. China will need to enforce this provision, seek-
ing out violations and taxing gray goods. Unfortunately, this likely de-
pends on China’s emergence as a developed nation. 
Given this time lag, reality will likely show that companies who bene-
fit from globalization will have to accept the bad with the good. IPRs are 
only valid in the state in which they are granted,261 and it is important to 
remember that even in the United States such rights are not absolute. 
These companies, who have been lobbying countries for protection and 
thus international action, may have to approach the market knowing the 
consequences and taking preventative measures that account for potential 
parallel importing, like dubbing films in the target language.262 
CONCLUSION 
While China has implemented an impressive, comprehensive written 
statutory system protecting intellectual property to Western standards, 
copyright and trademark claims from parallel importation are not gaining 
the traction seen in developed countries around the world. China’s weak 
IPR enforcement pertaining to parallel imports is highlighted by its 
patchy judicial decisions. While it appears that the first sale doctrine ex-
ists to some degree, limiting copyright claims, trademark protection con-
tinues to compete with parallel importation. Although at least three cases 
have been decided on the topic, and the only clarification is that safety 
inspections of a product will alter the product’s status. Instead, China 
seems to simply gesture to its international treaty obligations, but still 
hides behind its ability to grow its economy and cultural differences. 
While WTO action from the United States and European Union could 
follow, this process is proving impotent. Unless there is a specific pact 
and tariff, parallel importation will likely remain one of the negatives 
(from the corporate and developed nation perspective) of globalization. 
In order to compete globally, one must set prices to sell in each market, 
and the gray market is an undeniable side effect. While there is some 
legal protection in affluent developed countries, this issue may deepen 
the schism of development. 
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